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Abstract
We investigate the cross-time and cross-nation comparability of party left-right position measurements by expert surveys and the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). While expert surveys show party left-right positions to be mostly static, we find the CMP
records systematic party movements for one-third of the parties analyzed. On the issue of cross-national comparability, we find
cross-national variation in expert surveys is muted. They contain little more than the variation associated with reputations based
on party-family affiliation. The CMP measurements, on the other hand, contain variation attributable to national party-system dif-
ferences. We conclude with thoughts about why all of this is so and about how one might navigate the expert survey limitations
depending on the question one wants to answer about democratic politics and policy making.
 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Party left-right positions figure prominently in theo-
ries and analyses of democratic decision making. The
policy meaning of elections and of the policy represen-
tation that follows requires that parties communicate
along an identifiable single dimension, such as left-
right, so that voters and other decision makers can
know the meaning of the policy bundles parties em-
body. Our aim here is to investigate the possibilities
and limitations when using left-right party position
 Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 607 777 2946; fax: þ1 607 777
2675.
E-mail addresses: mdmcd@binghamton.edu (M.D. McDonald),
smendes@eeg.uminho.pt (S.M. Mendes), mkim@siue.edu (M. Kim).
1 Tel.: þ351 253 604 510; fax: þ351 253 676 375.
2 Tel.: þ618 650 2358; fax: þ618 650 3509.
0261-3794/$ - see front matter  2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.04.005JELS710_proof  14 Mascores from expert surveys and Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) to compare party locations across time
and across nations. Limitations, either cross-temporal
or cross-national, leave gaps in one’s ability to investi-
gate how parties operate to fulfill a promise of democ-
racydto enable popular control over public policy.
For instance, a measurement record of static party
positions when in fact party position taking is dynamic,
if it is, would make it impossible to investigate whether
parties try to accommodate the position of the median
voter (Downs, 1957; Adams, 2001), adapt their posi-
tions to one another or to their own past success
(Kollman et al., 1992, 1998), follow through on their
policy promises to voters while in government (Klinge-
mann et al., 1994), or supply sufficiently dynamic offer-
ings to electorates so as to make parties in parliament
and government accurately reflect the position ofy 2006  1/14
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median voters in the long run (McDonald et al., 2004).
Non-comparable measurements of left-right positions
across nations render doubtful the results of analyses
into whether left- and right-leaning governments in dif-
ferent nations adopt different policies (Lijphart, 1999:
pp. 258e300; McDonald and Budge, 2005).
On the question of cross-time comparisons, what we
know from the outset is that left-right positions as mea-
sured by expert surveys are mostly static but for a small
amount of noise (McDonald andMendes, 2001: p. 100).
What is one to make of that? One possibility is that
party left-right position taking is, in fact, more static
than dynamic. And, even if it are more dynamic than
static, which is what expert observers assert when asked
(see, e.g., country-specific commentary in Mu¨ller and
Strøm, 2000), it is possible that empirical analysts
will have to work with static measurements and limit
their inquires to questions where party position dynam-
ics do not matter, because expert survey measurements
are the best we can do on the left-right dimension. To
confront these two possibilities, we use the CMP record
of party left-right positions over the post-War period to
investigate whether it is plausible to infer there are sys-
tematically observable party dynamics along the left-
right dimension.
On the question of cross-national comparisons, there
is no doubt that expert surveys and the CMP were de-
signed to capture these. Peter Mair and Frank Castles
put the point directly when they reflected on what mo-
tivated them to carryout their survey.
What was needed, ., was a more systematic data
base, in which variations across a common cross-
national scale could be compared, and in which
real differences between parties could be measured
(Mair and Castles, 1997: p. 151).
Whether Castles and Mair, others who pursued their
expert survey approach, and still others who worked on
the CMP succeeded in identified cross-nationally com-
parable party positions stands today more as an article
of faith than as an intensively investigated and demon-
strable fact. Here we investigate the success each has
had in measuring left-right positions in ways that permit
meaningful cross-national comparisons.
The analysis begins with a consideration of why one
should care about left-right positioning and how its
meaning is captured by the expert surveys of Castles
and Mair (1984), Laver and Hunt (1992), and Huber
and Inglehart (1995), on the one hand, and by the
CMP, on the other. Our results show that expert surveys
and the CMP can be used to characterize left-right party
positions in similar ways and that party positions inJELS710_proof  14 MayD
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several but not all policy domains are associated with
left-right. With that as the backdrop, our second analy-
sis proceeds to ask whether there are dynamics in the
left-right party positions worth recording and taking
into account. While expert surveys measure the long-
run general tendencies of party left-right positions,
our analysis of the CMP shows there are systematic dy-
namics to party left-right positions. Our third and final
analysis asks whether it is plausible to think expert sur-
veys and the CMP capture important differences across
nations. These results show that expert surveys do not
carry us much beyond what could be achieved by scor-
ing party left-right positions according to each one’s
party-family affiliation. The CMP, on the other hand, re-
cords meaningful differences across nations.
2. Left-right party positions
Left-right is the core currency of political exchange
in Western democracies (Huber and Inglehart, 1995).
As with price and quantity in economic exchange, it
is ever-present in the thinking about politics for most
scholars and commentators. That is not to credit left-
right with importance because it so often figures prom-
inently in political writing and conversation. To do so is
a flimsy ad populum fallacy. The serious argument runs
the other way around. Left-right, or some similar single-
dimension concept, is fundamentally important to em-
pirical and normative democratic theory, and therefore
theorists, analysts, and commentators frequent rely on
it to explain and evaluate the operation of democracies.
An important lesson to be taken from a half-century
of applying social choice theory to the study of demo-
cratic politics is this: if policy meaning can be gleaned
from democratic decision making, a single dimension
such as left-right is required. Collective decisions that
invoke several dimensions threaten to negate the possi-
bilities of elections having policy meaning (Dahl, 1956:
pp. 124e131; Epstein, 1964) and of a science of demo-
cratic politics (Riker, 1980; Ordeshook, 1980). Thus, if
democratic processes are capable of creating popular
control of public policy and, for political scientists, if
democratic processes are going to be the subject of sys-
tematic theorizing and testing, we must accept that
some forms of institutional arrangements, parties
among them, control dimensionality so as to induce
equilibrium expectations (Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1982). Other dimensions will come to the
fore from time to time, with the effect and sometimes
the purpose of upsetting equilibrium expectations
(Riker, 1983, 1986), but to grasp their importance one2006  2/14
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has to start with an understanding of what otherwise
would happen. That will usually come from a predomi-
nant dimension such as left-right. So even in the face of
multi-dimensionalmaneuvering, left-right has a theoret-
ical role to play.
What is meant when referring to policy preferences
as left and right? In contemporary politics it refers
most directly to the scope and breadth of what goods
and services should and should not be public goods.
Those who want the government to organize a nation’s
economy are on the left; those who want private enter-
prise to organize a national economy are on the right.
Advocating public ownership of industries puts one
far to the left, desires to have government closely regu-
late privately owned firms are not quite as far left. Gov-
ernment control over the means of production is only
part of the economic aspect. Economic distribution is-
sues, in terms of activities that we associate with the
modern welfare state, also distinguish left from right.
For example, is medical care a public good? Persons
and parties on the left versus right answer that question
differently. It should be delivered to those who have
earned enough to purchase it (right), to the elderly
only (center-right), to those whose resources indicate
they could not purchase it for themselves (center-left),
to everyone (left). The same question could be asked
about education, food, housing, clothing, etc. Being
on the right means one sees little if any need for govern-
ment involvement in the distribution of these goods and
services; gradations of being on the left see some
greater (more left) or lesser (less left) need for govern-
ment involvement.
It would bewrong, however, to describe the left-right
continuum entirely as a bundle of public good/eco-
nomic issues that go together in predictable ways?
That does not cover left-right in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies and it does not even cover some of the meaning
we have in mind today. The term left-right was around
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the
scope of public goods was so narrowly circumscribed
that the economic policy issues that are so prevalent
today played at most a small role in drawing a line of
distinction between those on the left and those on the
right. Furthermore, when talking about left-right in
contemporary times, the notion of extreme-right parties
is applied to nationalist parties with authoritarian pre-
scriptions for social order. Whether an extreme-right
party is neo-fascist in the sense that it advocates a large
economic role for government, or free-marketeer in
the sense of advocating little or no economic role for
government, or largely silent on economic matters,
extreme-right parties are easy to identify.JELS710_proof  14 MaD
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The idea that builds a bridge to the political dis-
course of the 18th and 19th centuries and that links
the concept of left-right to extreme-right parties of to-
day is the prescription for whether society ought to rec-
ognize privilege and, if so, on what basis. The left-right
actors of the 18th and 19th centuries engaged in debate
over whether the worth of human beings could be con-
ditioned by one’s inherited status and closeness to God.
There were privileges to be enjoyed by the landed nobil-
ity and ecclesiastical hierarchy, arguably. Liberals, on
the left, challenged this interpretation of the social or-
der; conservatives, on the right, defended it. We still
see remnants of the argument over privilege today.
Those on the extreme right want to grant privilege based
on blood lineage, whatever the privileges should bed
citizenship, voting rights, pensions and other forms of
welfare and social services, education, etc. And one’s
view of privilege has expanded so that it extends to
the definition and scope of public goods. Center-rightist
are more inclined to see privilege as something to be
earned, determined by what free-market benefits come
from one’s talents. Those on the left are inclined to
see less need to grant privilege for any reason, other
than by virtue of one’s humanity.
Here we ask how similar the tale of left-right posi-
tions is when recorded by expert survey and CMP
data. The three expert surveys and the CMP cover com-
monly 79 parties in 17 nations.3 The Castles-Mair and
Huber-Inglehart surveys were expressly designed to lo-
cate parties in the left-right space. Laver-Hunt asked ex-
perts to place parties along pro-con continua in each of
eight policy domains. The CMP codes policy emphasis
in 56 categories and uses 26 of them to construct a left-
right party score.
Fig. 1 shows the commonality in left-right party
scores for the two left-right expert surveys and the
CMP, as located in a factor space defined by the three
left-right scores and the eight policy category scores
from Laver-Hunt. Five of the eight Laver-Hunt issue
categories are highly correlated with left-right, though
clearly party alignments on matters of the environment,
urban interests, and decentralization, which have little
to say about privilege, leave room to maneuver outside
of the left-right space. After extracting two dimensions
(varimax rotation, with dimension extraction for eigen-
values 1.0), we rotated the axes so that the first factor
3 The nations are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Data
for this analysis and those reported below are available at the
Binghamton University website found at the following addressd
http://www.binghamton.edu/polsci/research/mcdonalddata.htm.y 2006  3/14
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Huber-Inglehart .95 .07 
CMP (1972-98 Average) .87 .12 
Tax/Spend .92 .13 
USSR, cold war .83 .11 
Market Economy .90 .07 
Social restrictiveness .85 -.23 
Pro clerical role .78 -.32 
Pro urban interests .61 -.70 
Decentralization .30 .45 
Pro environment .61 .47 
Fig. 1. Factor analysis results party positions.394
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factor is maximized and on the second factor is zero).
Given that the Castles-Mair loading on factor 1 is
0.94 and on factor 2 at 0.00, factor 1 is reasonably inter-
preted as something close to a left-right factor and noth-
ing else. With that, each squared loading (h2) on factor 1
can be interpreted as a statement of the validity of each
measure as an indicator of party left-right positions.
Castles-Mair and Huber-Inglehart are the two most
valid measures by this methodology and its associated
assumptions, with h2 values in the vicinity of 0.9. The
CMP is a fairly valid indicator, by the standards of
validity founded on the expert surveys, but about a sixth
of its variance is distinctly different from that of the
expert surveysdi.e., CMP squared loading, h2, is
0.872 or 0.76, and 1  (0.76/0.90) ¼ 0.16.
What contributes to the CMP distinctiveness? One
possibility is that the CMP contains one-sixth more
noise than the expert measures. Another possibility is
that the specific variance (in contrast to its common var-
iance, to use factor analysis terminology) in CMPJELS710_proof  14 Mayscores accounts for something real but which is not
shared by the expert scoring.
What might be the sources of real (systematic) vari-
ation in CMP scores that is not commonly shared with
the expert survey scores? The two possibilities we ex-
plore below are that the CMP left-right scores contain
variation associated with a degree of dynamic party po-
sition taking that expert surveys mostly miss and a de-
gree of cross-national differentiation that expert
surveys also miss.
3. Party positions and their dynamics
Elsewhere, McDonald and Mendes have shown that
expert survey scores are highly reliable but have very
little dynamic variation (McDonald and Mendes,
2001: p. 100). This is troubling because it presents us
with the possibility that expert scores are operating as
if they describe general left-right tendencies across
time, a mean position for each party. Such fixed posi-
tions have something very appealing going for them.
They appear highly reliable from one decade to the2006  4/14
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next; because they are measuring the same thing at dif-
ferent times. But this appealing reliability comes at a po-
tentially high price: They preclude analyzing party
movements, if there are real party movements.
Are the expert scores missing any important dy-
namic variation? We investigate that possibility by ana-
lyzing the dynamics of party left-right locations for 81
parties in 17 Western nations using the CMP data set
(Budge et al., 2001).4 Except as noted for two Danish
parties and with allowance for the special circum-
stances of Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands,
the 81 parties include those for which we have data on
coded manifestos in consecutive elections totaling more
than half of a nation’s elections from the late 1940s
through 1998.5 The Belgian parties split along language
lines during the period 1968e77, and we treat the pre-
and post-splits as separate party systems. Parties during
France’s Fifth Republic, but not during the Fourth Re-
public, are included. The analysis of Italian parties stops
in 1992 after which many of the Italian parties reconfig-
ured. Finally, the three separate Christian parties in the
Netherlands combined at the time of the 1977 Dutch
election to form the CDA; the three parties and the
CDA are treated as four separate parties.
In the factor analysis (Fig. 1), the CMP party scores
were their averages over the 1972 through 1998 period.
As a first step in examining dynamics we can ask how
reliable post-War average party positions are given the
left-right movements recorded by the CMP. The ques-
tion is whether a static representation as portrayed by
mean values, in the face of the over-time variation of
each party’s position, is a reliable characterization. It
4 These are not the exact same 17 nations used in the factor anal-
ysis. Here we exclude Spain, because the number of elections since
democratization is too small and we include Luxembourg, which
was not present in the factor analysis because its parties had not
been scored by Castles and Mair.
5 A few data points in CMP are estimated, based on a party’s man-
ifesto at an earlier election. Such carryover data present problems for
our analyses on two counts. They artificially reduce variations and
create autocorrelation. Therefore, we exclude carryover manifestos.
The exclusion is usually for one election at the beginning or end
of a party’s series. The single election exclusions are the Belgian
PVV in 1995, the Belgian FDF in 1965, the Belgian VU in 1958,
the Canadian SC in 1972 and 1974, all Danish parties in 1998, all
Norwegian parties in 1997, and the Swiss SVP in 1947. Dropping
the 1998 Danish data caused observations on the Danish CD and
KF to go from 11 of 22 (half) to 10 of 21 (less than half). Still, we
decided to keep both Danish parties in the analyses. In the case of
the French Conservatives, the entire series had to be excluded be-
cause several of its manifestos are recorded as estimates. Also, the
single manifesto score of the United Socialists in Italy for the 1968
election is the 1968 score that we assign individually and separately
to the PSI and PSDI.JELS710_proof  14 MaD
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is not. Regressing the observed positions onto the party
mean values reveals a slope of 1.0, as required by defi-
nition. The R2, however, is only 0.649 (N ¼ 924, 17 na-
tions times the number of parties per nation times the
number of manifestos per party). That means that
only about two-thirds of the systematic variance in
these data is coming from differences in average party
positions. The remaining one-third is noise, real move-
ments in party positions, or some combination.
3.1. Party left-right dynamics
We assess whether evidence of systematic change in
party positioning exists by estimating an autoregressive
equation on each party’s series of positions. Three dif-
ferent patterns could result. First, party positions that
shift over the long run, such as those forming a trend,
will result in an autoregressive equation that indicates
a party’s long-run expected value (a sort of dynamic
mean) is different from its mean.6 Second, a party that
changes by drifting away from its mean position for
a sustained period but later coming back to it, a charac-
teristic of cyclical movements, will result in an autore-
gressive equation with patterned change that leaves the
long-run expected value and the mean close to one an-
other. Third, autoregressive results indicating that the
mean is a reasonable description regardless of a party’s
position at the previous election (i.e., the slope could
reasonably be inferred to be zero) are situations where
parties are moving as-if randomly around their respec-
tive mean positions, neither trending nor drifting.
To describe in more detail how the autoregressive
equation can be used to identify what we label in
accordance with the three patterns, respectively, as:
(1) changers; (2) drifters; and (3) homeostatic
wanderers, we start with the equation as applied to
any one party’s left-right position. It takes this form:
LRt ¼ aþ bLRt1þ 3t$
LRt is a party’s left-right position for the current elec-
tion; LRt1 is that party’s left-right position at the pre-
vious election; a is the intercept; b is the slope; and 3t is
6 As we explain immediately below, the dynamic mean we are re-
ferring to is distinguishable from the commonly referred to mean. For
estimation of a dynamic mean one first estimates a bivariate autore-
gressive equation to determine whether the slope is zero. If the slope
is zero, then the mean value of Y at any given time is estimated to be
equal to the autoregressive intercept. If the slope is different from
zero, then the mean, which is estimated to vary, is calculated by di-
viding the intercept by one minus the slope. For informative discus-
sions about autoregressive equations, with substantive applications to
politics, see Spafford (1971) and Price and Sanders (1993).y 2006  5/14
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assumed to be a set of well behaved, homoscedastic and
non-autocorrelated, errors in party positions at the cur-
rent elections. When the estimated value of b is not dis-
tinguishable from zero, it indicates that the movements
around the party left-right mean are, so far as we can
tell, random deviations from which a party can be ex-
pected to return to its typical (mean) position at the
next election. When b is distinguishable from zero
and in the interval 1 to þ1 (all of our estimates are
in that interval), party movements show signs of sus-
tained changes through time. For example, a statistically
significant slope of 0.75 indicates that a deviation from
the party’s long-run typical left-right position is ex-
pected to move toward (but not to) that position at the
next election. The speed at which it approaches that
long-run typical position is (1  b). In the case of the
example, (1  b) is 1  0.75, or 0.25; therefore that
party is expected to move one-quarter of the way
from where it was at the last election toward where it
is expected to be in the long run.
The difference between where we can expect a party
to be in the long run and where it is on average is one
way to describe how and by how much a party has
changed. To estimate where a party’s left-right position
will be in the long run, we divide the intercept by the
value of one minus the slopedi.e., [a/(1  b)] (see
Spafford, 1971; Price and Sanders, 1993).
As we shall see, there are parties for which the
slope is distinguishable from zero and the difference
between the mean and the party’s long-run expected
position is large. These are the parties we label
changers. There are also instances of parties with
slopes distinguishable from zero but with small differ-
ences between its mean versus its long-run expected
value. These are parties that drifted one way, then
the otherdgoing through cycles of reliably predictable
and moderately sustained movements. We call these
parties drifters. Finally, there are parties that diverge
from and converge towards their mean values in an un-
predictable manner. For these parties, movements
away from their mean positions are expected to be
short-lived, with an expectation of each one returning
to its mean position at the next election. We call these
parties homeostatic wanderers.
For a party with patterns of change that show a shift
to a new position, as would be true for a party whose po-
sitions create a trend, we have said there is a large dif-
ference between its mean left-right position and its
long-run expected left-right position. Fig. 2 is a histo-
gram that displays these differences for each of the 81
parties. Not many parties show much difference. Only
10 of the 81 parties (12.3%) have expectedJELS710_proof  14 MayD
P
R
O
O
F
long-run positions that differ from their respective
mean positions by more than 4 points. Two of those
10 partiesdthe Dutch CDA and Italy’s PSIdshow
changes larger than 4, but their changes are based
on estimated slopes that we deem to be unreliable.7
That leaves eight parties that changed their left-right
positions through time in a reliably estimated manner.
They are the eight, so-called, changers.
The eight changers are listed in Table 1. There, too,
we provide a description of the pattern of change along
with each party’s mean value over the period, its so-
called target position (which is where, based on our
analysis, we expect the party left-right position to
move to over the long run), and its left-right position
by decade. The first thing to notice is that of the eight
changers four no longer existed in the same organiza-
tional form in the late 1990s. Two Italian parties, the
PSDI and PRI, each of which had been moving to the
right, were themselves transformed when the party sys-
tem as a whole changed after the 1992 election. In ad-
dition, two other changers are Dutch Christian
partiesdARP and CHUdthat combined, also with
the Catholic KVP, to form the Christian Democratic Al-
liance (CDA) in the 1970s. The movements of both
Dutch (Protestant) Christian parties show a trend left-
ward, and after they merged into the CDA they held
a center-left position. That leaves four parties that
have different left-right positions in the 1990s com-
pared to positions they took in, say, 1960. Patterns of
change for these four are consistent with what informed
7 We take what could be considered a liberal approach to a decision
rule for reliably estimated relationships, but what we have done in
fact is to take account of the effect of measurement error. Errors in
an X variable reduce the magnitude of an estimated slope, and errors
in both the X and Y variables are likely to increase the slope’s stan-
dard error. Given that a t-ratio is (b/sb), the effect of measurement er-
rors makes tests of statistical significance at conventional levels (e.g.,
P < 0.05) prone to Type II errors. Therefore, we loosen the conven-
tional standard of, say, P < 0.05 so that reliably predicted behavior is
deemed to exist when a slope’s t-value has a magnitude such that
t < 1.5 or t > 1.5. Twenty-one parties show a statistically signifi-
cant relationship at conventional levels, compared to 27 using our
looser 1.5 t-value. Note that the liberal decision rule has no effect
on our subsequent analyses and evaluations, except to cause us to
provide detailed descriptions of change for 27 (8 changers and 19
drifters) in Tables 1 and 2, instead of 21 parties. Tests of statistical
significance could also be affected by autocorrelated errors. We
have checked for autocorrelation for each of the 81 party series.
When a lagged value of Y is on the right hand side, the test (e.g., Dur-
bin’s h) is a large sample test and is not especially powerful. With our
small samples, between 6 and 21 elections for any one party, about
half of the tests are not calculable. However, we can and have calcu-
lated values of rho for all parties. We find an estimated rho between
0.25 for 72 of the 81 parties. Therefore, in no more than few cases
could it be said that a concern about autocorrelation is warranted.2006  6/14
ARTICLE IN PRESS
7M.D. McDonald et al. / Electoral Studies xx (2006) 1e14
+ MODEL
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704C
TEobservers of these parties tell us was happening
throughout the period. The Austrian FPO¨ is reported
to have placed itself to the left during the 1960s in order
to gain favor with the SPO¨ for government coalition
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Fig. 2. Histogram of the difference between a party’s mean and long-
run. Expected left-right position. Source: Compiled by authors from
CMP data (Budge et al., 2001). aOne large leftward changer (34,
Dutch ARP) is not fully depicted in this representation; it is one of
the three cases in the category labeled <12.JELS710_proof  14 MayD
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bargaining purposes, then gave up that strategy and
moved decidedly to the right (Mu¨ller, 2000: p. 87).
Mair (1986) reports that Fine Gael took noticeable steps
to the left during the 1960s and 1970s and stood clearly
to the left of Fianna Fa´il during that time. Hanne Marthe
Narud and Kaare Strøm have said of the leftward drift of
Norway’s SP that ‘‘the party’s opposition to European
integration has gradually generalized into a greater
skepticism towards market economies’’ (Narud and
Strøm, 2000: p. 164). Finally, the Democrats in the
United States, especially under the leadership of Presi-
dent Clinton but presaged by smaller movements to-
ward the center during the 1980s, is generally
understood to have moved to the center (see, e.g., Erik-
son et al., 2002).
Nineteen parties are classified as drifters, more than
twice the number of changers. The drifters are listed in
Table 2. Recall that our classification criterion for
drifters versus changers is that, while a drifter’s posi-
tion undergoes predictable and sustained changes, in
the long run its left-right position is not expected to
be much different from its mean position over the en-
tire period. This is reflected in the column in the mid-
dle of the table, where the mean and (long-run) target
values are reported. One general pattern of drift covers
the Anglo-American parties. In Australia, New Zea-
land, UK, and U.S., the drifters each drifted rightward,
a movement that also describes the U.S. Democrats in705
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Identification and description of movements by changers
Country Party CMPid L-R
Mean
L-R
Target
Pattern of change
Numerical value of L-R mean by decade
Austria FPO¨ 42420 2.5 14.2 Started center, moved left, then steadily back to center and continued on past
center to right
50s ¼ þ4.5 60s ¼ 26.8 70s ¼ 13.8 80s ¼ þ4.6 90s ¼ þ39.5
Ireland FG 53520 11.1 6.5 Started right, moved steadily to center-left until 80s, then moved to center-right
50s ¼ þ46.6 60s ¼ 2.0 70s ¼ 17.6 80s ¼ þ2.8 90s ¼ þ9.3
Italy PSDI 32330 12.2 4.5 Started left and moved rather steadily toward and to center
50s ¼ 28.5 60s ¼ 24.1 70s ¼ 5.3 80s ¼ þ3.5 90s ¼ þ2.3
Italy PRI 32410 0.7 15.3 Started left-center and moved, in step-like manner, rather steadily to right
50s ¼ 17.0 60s ¼ 10.0 70s ¼ 1.0 80s ¼ þ22.8 90s ¼ þ36.7
Netherlands ARP 22523 5.0 29.6 Steady movement from center-right to center-left when it ended in early 70s
50s ¼ þ16.1 60s ¼ þ1.6 70s ¼ 16.1 80s ¼www 90s ¼www
Netherlands CHU 22525 8.9 3.1 Started right, moved to center in the 60s and ended in center-left in the early 70s
50s ¼ þ21.5 60s ¼ þ4.0 70s ¼ 17.7 80s ¼www 90s ¼www
Norway SP 12810 5.3 17.3 Started right-center, moved steadily and quickly left, reaching left-center by
mid-60s and stayed there
50s ¼ þ18.8 60s ¼ 12.7 70s ¼ 16.6 80s ¼ 15.7 90s ¼ 15.6
U.S. DEM 61320 12.8 1.9 Started left-center into the 1980s, then moved steadily to and through center to
center-right
50s ¼ 19.1 60s ¼ 15.6 70s ¼ 20.4 80s ¼ 14.1 90s ¼ þ10.5
Source: Estimations and compilations by authors based on CMP data (Budge et al., 2001). A changing party takes left-right positions in a manner
that change predictably from one election to the next and show estimated long-run left-right position away from its mean left-right position over the
post-war period (beyond 4 points).2006  7/14
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Table 2
Identification and description of movements by drifters
Country Party CMPid L-R
Mean
L-R
Target
Pattern of drift
Numerical value of L-R mean by decade
Australia LAB 63320 11.1 7.3 Started left, stayed left through the 70s, drifted to varied positions at and around the center
50s ¼ 22.5 60s ¼ 14.2 70s ¼ 22.1 80s ¼ þ3.2 90s ¼ þ5.6
Belgium CVP 21521 1.9 1.5 Started center-left in late 60s, moved steadily to center-right in 80s, and moved to center
50s ¼www 60s ¼ 12.8 70s ¼ 8.2 80s ¼ þ7.7 90s ¼ þ1.7
Belgium VU 21913 2.9 3.4 Started center, veered to center left in late 60s, climbed back center-right and moved
to center
50s ¼www 60s ¼ 5.8 70s ¼ 8.4 80s ¼ þ4.7 90s ¼ 2.9
Canada PC 62620 4.2 6.2 Center until mid-70s and drifted to right-center thereafter
50s ¼ 2.4 60s ¼ 0.6 70s ¼ þ2.3 80s ¼ þ14.9 90s ¼ þ17.6
Denmark CD 13330 21.9 21.3 Started right (70s), stay right in 80s and moved to center in 90s
50s ¼www 60s ¼www 70s ¼ þ26.7 80s ¼ þ25.1 90s ¼ þ6.0
Denmark KrF 13520 20.3 18.6 Started right (70s), moved to center-right in 80s, and stayed
50s ¼www 60s ¼www 70s ¼ þ30.0 80s ¼ þ12.2 90s ¼ þ12.3
Ireland FF 53620 6.4 8.3 Started center, moved right in 60s and 70s, jumped back to center in late 70s and
stayed center
50s ¼ þ8.0 60s ¼ þ22.4 70s ¼ þ26.5 80s ¼ 10.2 90s ¼ þ0.7
Netherlands PvdA 22320 25.0 25.5 Started left (60s), moved steadily left in 60s and 70s, and back toward and to center-left in
80s and 90s
50s ¼ 21.3 60s ¼ 27.6 70s ¼ 43.3 80s ¼ 22.5 90s ¼ 8.9
Netherlands D’66 22330 18.3 18.3 Started left (60s), moved further left in 70s, and to center-left in 80s and 90s
50s ¼www60s ¼ 18.3 70s ¼ 30.8 80s ¼ 11.7 90s ¼ 13.0
N.Z. LAB 64320 24.4 24.5 Started left, moved steadily toward center in 60s and 70s, drifted unsteadily back to left
in mid-80s and 90s
50s ¼ 34.6 60s ¼ 29.4 70s ¼ 16.4 80s ¼ 11.2 90s ¼ 22.2
Norway KF 12520 0.1 2.4 Started center-right, drifted steadily to center-left till 90s, and jumped back to center
50s ¼ þ15.7 60s ¼ 4.5 70s ¼ 5.2 80s ¼ 13.8 90s ¼ þ2.0
Norway Høyre 12620 4.2 3.2 Started center-right, drifted steadily toward center-left from 60 till mid-70s, and moved
back to center-right
50s ¼ þ16.4 60s ¼ 0.0 70s ¼ 14.2 80s ¼ 2.3 90s ¼ þ14.4
Sweden SDP 11320 23.2 20.6 Started left, moving a little further left in 60s, jumped to center-left in early 70s, drifted
back left, only to move to center in 90s
50s ¼ 32.7 60s ¼ 46.0 70s ¼ 18.9 80s ¼ 21.2 90s ¼ þ4.7
Sweden FP 11420 4.2 6.4 Started center-right, jumped to left in 60s, and gradually drifted back to center-right
50s ¼ þ10.8 60s ¼ 33.4 70s ¼ 15.6 80s ¼ þ3.3 90s ¼ þ12.5
Sweden MSP 11620 36.9 34.9 Started right, moved to center-right in 70s, moved back to right
50s ¼ þ51.8 60s ¼ þ40.3 70s ¼ þ14.0 80s ¼ þ40.5 90s ¼ þ40.5
Sweden CP 11810 3.3 0.7 Started center drifting right, swung center-left in 60s and stayed until early 80s, drifted
to center-right
50s ¼ þ2.5 60s ¼ 6.5 70s ¼ 16.2 80s ¼ 6.8 90s ¼ þ12.9
Switzerland CVP 43520 10.1 6.6 Started right, jumped to center in mid 60s and stays center
50s ¼ þ25.1 60s ¼ þ19.9 70s ¼ þ1.2 80s ¼ þ0.6 90s ¼ 6.8
U.K. CON 51620 7.9 10.5 Started variably though slightly left, drifted toward center-right through 60s and 70s and
to right in 80s and 90s
50s ¼ 8.0 60s ¼ þ0.8 70s ¼ þ11.0 80s ¼ þ29.7 90s ¼ þ26.8
U.S. REP 61620 13.9 15.9 Started erratically around center, more reliably center in late 60s and 70s, and moved right
in 80s and 90s
50s ¼ þ7.0 60s ¼ þ4.3 70s ¼ þ3.7 80s ¼ þ28.5 90s ¼ þ27.3
Source: Estimations and compilations by authors based on CMP data (Budge et al., 2001). A drifting party takes left-right positions in a manner that
change predictably from one election to the next but has an estimated long-run left-right position close to its mean left-right position over the post-
war period (within 4 points).
827
828
829
830
831
832Table 1. The reason many of these appear to be drifters
rather than changers is that along the way their move-
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the spectrum during the 1980s and 1990sdthe Irish
FF, Danish CD and KrF, and the Swiss CVP. Fianna
Fa´il moved rightward in the 1960s and 1970s only to
move leftward toward the center in the 1980s and
1990s. The two Danish parties, CD and KrF, started
on the right, both having won seats for the first time
in the traumatic 1973 election and tended to move
slightly leftward toward a center-right position thereaf-
ter. The Swiss CVP appears to have moved erratically
but decidedly to the left over the entire period.
The modal outcome is that of the homeostatic wan-
derers. There are 54 of them, 66.7% of all the parties an-
alyzed. These are parties that, as the wandering portion
of their label suggests, have moved around without de-
veloping patterns of sustained change across time. We
say of them, then, that, so far as we can tell from the au-
toregressive estimations, their movements are as-if ran-
dom. Of course, the ‘‘homeostatic’’ qualifier in the label
indicates that a party’s wandering is anchored in amean-
ingful position, presumably to their leaders as well as to
voters.
It is proper to ask whether the wandering is unteth-
ered or homeostatic. A set of completely random num-
bers will have a mean; hence having a mean can hardly
be a justification for inferring that these parties have an
identifiable ideological home. The inference of homeo-
stasis, therefore, rests on how widely these parties wan-
der away from their respective mean positions. The
standard deviations around the mean positions of ho-
meostatic wanderers are actually slightly smaller on av-
erage than the standard deviations around the regression
lines of the changers and the drifters. Among the 54 ho-
meostatic wanderers, the average standard deviation is
12.4; for the changers and drifters, the average standard
deviation around their regression lines (average se
values) is 13.4. In that sense, the unpredictable variation
of the homeostatic wanderers based on their means is
slightly less than the unpredictable variation based on
the otherwise predictable movements of the changers
and drifters. In short, a mean position of a homeostatic
wanderer generally characterizes its positions as well as
a regression equation characterizes a position of
a changer or drifter.
Our evidence indicates that one-third of the 81
parties changed their left-right positions in systematic
ways. It also indicates that around our best estimate of
a party’s position through time there is something on
the order of 13 standard deviation units of error.
Given the systematic change, it is necessary to try to
capture the dynamic aspects of party positioning.
A word of caution is in order. Almost surely all the
remaining dynamic variation beyond that which weJELS710_proof  14 MayD
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have labeled systematic should not be thrown on the
junk pile, to be labeled noise. Statistical models of
cross-temporal attributions of stability, change, and
noise require one to have in mind a model of ‘true be-
havioral change’ in order to be able to separate noise
in the measurements from change in the behavior
(Heise, 1969). Typically, the implicit model of
‘‘true’’ behavior change is a Markovian process. This
is the model implicit in the interpretations we put to
our autoregressive equations. In effect, the assumption
says that when behavior truly changes it does so sys-
tematically (i.e., in predictable ways). It then adds by
implication that to the extent behavior is not predict-
able the remaining portion of the measured signal is
noise. A close examination of systematic change by
party that we report would reveal at least a few widely
accepted real changes that do not show themselves as
such in our results. One clear example is Britain’s La-
bour Party. Surely it has moved from left to right under
the leadership of Tony Blair and the CMP records that
movement. But, because it showed up so late in the
CMP series, it effectively is left as noise, because by
1998 it was still too early to say whether the move-
ment was systematic.
4. Cross-national variation
We accept that an important purpose of left-right
party position indicators is what Castles and Mair
have said it is, to provide valid indications of party dif-
ferences within and across nations. We also accept that
party family affiliations are not up to the task of drawing
consistent distinctions between parties across nations,
even though family affiliations are surely useful for
rank orderings within nations (see, for example, the
within-nation rank orders from different studies in
Mair, 2001: pp. 21e22).
Under the assumption that family affiliation does
not travel especially well across nations, we expect
that some part of the variation within families comes
from national influences on individual parties. Nor-
way’s political space, for example, while containing
variance that is largely associated with parties from
different families, makes its own contribution to the lo-
cation of Norwegian parties. For that reason, we ex-
pect Norway’s political parties to be generally to the
left of parties that share a nominal family affiliation
in, say, Australia and the United States. This is because
Norway’s labor party (DNA), an affiliate of the social
democratic family, is to the left of the social demo-
cratic family affiliates of Australian Labour and Amer-
ican Democrats. As well, we expect the Norwegian2006  9/14
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Høyre (conservative family) to be to the left of Austra-
lian Liberals and American Republicans (also conser-
vative family affiliates).
Our analyses focus on 79 parties belonging to one of
eight families in 17 nations, the same nations used in the
factor analysis above (see fn. 1). We include parties
from eight families: communists, greens, social demo-
crats, liberals, Christians, agrarians, conservatives, and
nationalists. To create a left-right score from the
Laver-Hunt data, we follow the recommendation in
McDonald and Mendes (2001: p. 99) and calculate
a weighted sum of the Laver-Hunt scores on their public
ownership, tax/spend, and social permissiveness policy
dimensions. The CMP scores are based on average
left-right scores over the period 1978e96 (except for
Italy for which we calculate a CMP mean through the
1992 elections). For convenience, we linearly trans-
formed all four sets of scores so that each one’s metric
ranges from a minimum of zero (0 ¼ extreme left) to
a maximum of ten (10 ¼ extreme right). In the case of
the CMP data, for which possible maximum left and
right values are far removed from the observed maxi-
mum values, the re-scaling set 50 ¼ 0, 0 ¼ 5, and
þ50 ¼ 10di.e., the re-scaled CMP scores equal
[(CMP þ 50)/10].
4.1. Cross-family variation
We begin by investigating how the four sets of left-
right scores line-up by party family. The family aver-
ages are shown in Table 3. As one would expect, on av-
erage, communists are far left; greens and social
democrats are on the left; liberals, agrarians, and Chris-
tians are center to center-right; conservatives are on the
right; and nationalists are far right. On this general or-
dering, all four data sets agree.
A more detailed consideration table, however, with
attention focused on variability across and within fam-
ilies, shows the CMP data stand distinct from the three
sets of expert survey data. Perhaps most noteworthy is
more cross-family and less within-family variation in
the expert survey sets compared to the CMP. The ex-
perts record more homogeneity within families and
more distinctiveness between and among families
compared to the record from the CMP. A statistical
representation of this is apparent from the R2 values
at the bottom of the table. Sizable proportions of the
left-right variation for the expert data are associated
with family affiliation; all three exceed 0.8. Given
that error variance (simple noise) almost surely consti-
tutes between 5 and 10 percent of the total variance of
each set of expert scores, these R2 values are probablyJELS710_proof  14 May 2D
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too high for confidence that the expert survey results
are capturing important within-family, cross-national
differences. At a minimum this is contrary to the stated
purpose of moving beyond family to more finely
graded left-right scores. Therefore, at first reading,
the expert survey data do not appear to tell us much
about left-right party positions beyond what party fam-
ily affiliations, standing alone, could have told us. That
the CMP data are not so strongly associated with party
family, having an R2 of 0.553, is therefore potentially
good news. Is it? The answer depends on whether the
CMP variation not associated with party family is at-
tributable in part to variation from cross-national
differences.
4.2. Cross-national variation
One way to estimate where in left-right space each
nation’s party system operates relative to the space of
other nations’ party systems is to calculate the distance
between each party’s left-right position and its family
mean and then average those distances by nation.8 For
nations whose parties stand uniformly to the left of their
respective family means, the average distance will be
negative; for nations whose parties stand uniformly to
the right of their respective family means, the average
distance will be positive.
Table 4 reports the national averages. For the CMP
data, a statistically significant 38 percent of the varia-
tion in these party differences is associated with the na-
tions. Among the expert survey sets of scores, the
constructed left-right score for Laver-Hunt has the high-
est percent of variance associated with nations, 32 per-
cent, but with such a large number of dummy variables
it falls just short of statistical significance (F ¼ 1.780,
P ¼ 0.055). For the Castles-Mair as well as the
Huber-Inglehart scores, the variance associated with
8 Analyzing difference-score variables can create inferential com-
plications. They assume that the coefficient on X, in a (YX) calcu-
lation, is 1.0. If it is not, then analyzing the reasons for the
differences reflects in part the reasons for the differences themselves
and in part the reasons why the coefficient is not 1.0. We have
checked to ensure that such complications do not confound our anal-
yses of cross-national differences. In addition to asking how the dif-
ference scores relate to nation dummy variables, we created
a variable from the party family means and moved it to the right-hand
side of the equation. Thereafter we regressed the respective party
scores onto the mean party family values (i.e., Y-hat from the party
family regression) plus the nation dummy variables. That allows us
to check whether the coefficient on that variable is equal 1.0. It is
very nearly equal to 1.0 for all four sets of party left-right
scoresdCMP, Y-hat slope, ¼ 1.003 Castles and Mair ¼ 1.010; Laver
and Hunt ¼ 1.009; and Huber and Inglehart ¼ 0.994.006  10/14
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Table 3
Average party left-right positions by party family
Party family N Mean (Standard Deviation)
Manifesto Project Castles & Mair Laver & Hunt Huber & Inglehart
Communist 8 1.83 (0.99) 1.70 (0.48) 1.77 (0.35) 1.86 (0.43)
Social Democrat 22 3.75 (1.18) 3.54 (0.98) 3.80 (1.08) 3.74 (0.82)
Green 4 3.62 (1.29) 3.83 (0.83) 3.45 (0.70) 2.85 (0.71)
Liberal 13 5.35 (1.52) 5.84 (1.17) 6.10 (1.33) 6.01 (1.30)
Agrarian 5 5.16 (1.60) 6.10 (0.99) 6.19 (0.66) 6.39 (1.35)
Christian Democrat 11 5.67 (1.08) 6.31 (0.70) 6.79 (0.49) 6.27 (0.99)
Conservative 14 6.13 (1.63) 7.18 (0.73) 7.12 (0.87) 6.95 (0.77)
Nationalist 2 7.89 (1.06) 9.45 (0.50) 8.55 (0.95) 9.63 (0.53)
All Parties 79 4.70 (1.91) 5.09 (2.08) 5.23 (2.05) 5.12 (2.06)
Summary Statistics
R2 0.553 0.832 0.844 0.812
R2 0.509 0.815 0.829 0.793
se 1.336 0.892 0.850 0.936
Notes: Table entries are for party families mean left-right locations based on zero-to-ten metrics for all four data sets. Summary statistics come from
regressing the party positions onto dummy variables for each of seven families, withholding one family to serve as the baseline category.1111
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the nation dummy variables is clearly not greater than
chance.
The findings in Table 3 combined with those in
Table 4 suggest that party locations identified by expert
surveys, especially Castles-Mair and Huber-Inglehart,
correspond so closely to party family affiliation that
information about nations does not tell us very much
about party positions. This conclusion should not be
overdrawn however; it is conditional upon a statistical
analysis that considers all nations jointly. When atten-
tion is switched to specific nations, one can see common
tendencies that have to be taken to mean that not all the
expert cross-national differences are just noise. All four
data sets, for example, have parties in Canada placed to
the left of their family counterparts. Also, the CMP and
expert surveys commonly place parties in Australia to
the right of their respective families, on average. Given
such commonalities, it has to be said that there is some
degree of cross-national validity, or at least reliability,
in all four studies.
The question is whether the selected common
tendencies are generalizable. We can look at the
generalizability by correlating the four sets of national
positions reported in Table 4. The six correlations are
(N ¼ 17):
CMP & C-M ¼ 0.575 (P ¼ 0.008)
CMP & L-H ¼ 0.703 (P ¼ 0.001)
CMP & H-I ¼ 0.329 (not significant, P ¼ 0.099)
C-M & L-H ¼ 0.427 (P ¼ 0.049)
C-M & H-I ¼ 0.036 (not significant, P ¼ 0.445)
L-H & H-I ¼ 0.742 (P < 0.001)JELS710_proof  14 MayD
The evidence of generalizable commonalities across
the four studies is mixed. The Castles-Mair national
spaces share essentially no variance with Huber-
Inglehart (r ¼ 0.036; therefore, r2 ¼ 0.001). The CMP
and Laver-Hunt country locations along with the
Laver-Hunt and Huber-Inglehart locations share some-
thing in the vicinity of 50 percent of variance. In-
between, the CMP and Castles-Mair share about a third
of their variation and Castles-Mair and Laver-Hunt
share about one-sixth.
Close inspection of the country-specific numbers in
Table 2 reveals that the mixed generalizability comes
in large part from five nations being located in very
different positions in one or another of the data sets.
Castles-Mair places Spanish parties substantially to
the right in relation to their party families while the
other three studies have Spanish parties substantially
to the left relative to their party families. Also,
Castles-Mair locates the Austrian system near the center
while the other three place it considerably to the right.
Huber-Inglehart locates Finland’s parties on the right;
the other three have Finland on the left. Even more
surprising, Huber-Inglehart places the United States’
Democrats and Republicans to the left of their family
counterparts; the other three studies arrive at the more
commonly held view that American parties are substan-
tially to the right of family affiliates. Finally, the four
studies render a split decision on New Zealand’s party
system. Castles-Mair and the CMP put New Zealand’s
party system on the left, relatively speaking, while
Laver-Hunt and Huber-Inglehart report that New
Zealand’s party system is on the right.2006  11/14
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Table 4
Average distance, by nation, between party left-right positions and party family means
Country N Average distance (Standard Deviation)
Manifesto Project Castles & Mair Laver & Hunt Huber & Inglehart
Canada 3 0.64 (1.07) 0.52 (0.17) 1.20 (0.51) 1.01 (0.92)
Norway 6 1.38 (0.65) 0.48 (0.77) 0.57 (0.52) 0.31 (0.78)
UK 3 0.42 (1.80) 0.56 (1.02) 0.39 (1.49) 0.25 (0.96)
Ireland 4 0.90 (0.83) 0.06 (0.58) 0.34 (0.34) 0.37 (0.88)
Spain 5 0.61 (0.43) 0.59 (0.82) 0.58 (0.93) 0.56 (0.61)
Finland 7 0.46 (1.35) 0.20 (0.45) 0.06 (0.47) 0.58 (0.96)
Germany 5 0.02 (0.85) 0.01 (1.04) 0.13 (0.69) 0.34 (0.64)
France 6 0.51 (0.90) 0.13 (0.70) 0.08 (0.54) 0.11 (0.67)
Sweden 4 0.51 (1.49) 0.21 (0.52) 0.05 (0.45) 0.03 (0.89)
Italy 7 0.84 (1.15) 0.13 (0.97) 0.17 (0.74) 0.12 (0.76)
Belgium 7 0.18 (0.82) 0.13 (0.97) 0.14 (0.87) 0.23 (0.64)
Netherlands 4 0.29 (1.01) 0.22 (1.19) 0.23 (0.81) 0.20 (0.59)
New Zealand 2 0.53 (0.25) 0.46 (1.02) 0.67 (1.31) 0.82 (1.09)
Austria 3 1.05 (0.58) 0.03 (0.86) 0.51 (0.72) 0.82 (1.50)
Australia 4 1.33 (1.08) 0.83 (1.08) 0.42 (0.56) 0.18 (1.43)
Denmark 7 0.91 (1.88) 0.35 (0.98) 0.68 (1.01) 0.41 (1.07)
U.S. 2 1.25 (0.59) 0.44 (1.16) 0.72 (0.38) 0.35 (0.15)
Summary Statistics
R2 0.376 0.182 0.315 0.233
R2 0.216 0.029 0.138 0.035
se 1.129 0.863 0.753 0.877
Notes: Entries are average within-nation differences between a party’s location and its respective family mean. Negative/positive values mean that
parties within a given nation are on average to the left (negative) or right (positive) of their party family mean. Summary statistics come from re-
gressing the differences onto 16 nation-specific dummy variables, with one nation serving as the baseline. Standard deviations are reported in pa-
rentheses. Reporting the standard deviations supplies the greatest flexibility for readers to test hypotheses about individual nations. The
homoscedatic standard errors for nation i are equal to se/Oni, where se is the standard error of estimate from the regression (reported under summary
statistics at the bottom of the table). The standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity through weighted least squares equal (s/Oni), where s is the
standard deviation reported in the table. For testing paired comparisons without assuming homoscedasticity, the standard error for any pair of na-
tions, a and b, is O(sa/na þ sb/nb), where sa is the standard deviation for nation a, and sb is the standard deviation for nation b. Nations are ordered top
to bottom according to the average left-right national position across all four data sets, with left-most nations at the top.1227
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Recalculating the correlations of national spaces
across data sets after excluding the five anomalous na-
tions shows the following (N ¼ 12).
CMP & C-M ¼ 0.706 (P ¼ 0.005)
CMP & L-H ¼ 0.753 (P ¼ 0.003)
CMP & H-I ¼ 0.597 (P ¼ 0.021)
C-M & L-H ¼ 0.794 (P ¼ 0.001)
C-M & H-I ¼ 0.635 (P ¼ 0.013)
L-H & H-I ¼ 0.926 (P < 0.001)
Under the restricted set of 12 countries all the correla-
tions are statistically significant.
Considering the evidence overall, we conclude there
are problems with the cross-national comparability of
party spaces but that several of the problems are identifi-
able and, in part, surmountable. The cross-national varia-
tion in party locations identified in expert surveys appears
strongly conditioned by party family affiliation, and as
a consequence the cross-national variation is muted.JELS710_proof  14 May 25. Discussion and conclusion
Two aspects of our results are especially important.
First, party left-right positions change and drift in
systematic ways, movements the CMP measurements
allow one to observe but expert surveys do not. That
makes the CMP generally preferred to expert surveys
for analyses involving left-right party positions over
an appreciable amount of time. Second, cross-national
variation in expert survey left-right party positions is
muted; they contain little more than the variation
associated with party reputations as ascertained from
party-family affiliation. The CMP measurements con-
tain variation attributable to national differences.
Parties in Canada and Norway, for example, are rela-
tively more left-leaning within each party family com-
pared to parties in the same family in the U.S. and
Australia. Thus, on the cross-national comparability,
too, the CMP data are generally preferred to expert sur-
vey data.006  12/14
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What one makes of these findings and what one
does about the CMP data being generally preferred
depends on the theoretical concern and empirical con-
ditions of a particular investigation. The analyses pre-
sented here are not to be seen as a competition from
which a winner is declared. It is not so much that one
data set is good and the other bad or one is good but
the other better. Until a theoretical concern is speci-
fied, such claims are standard-less. Rather, one ap-
proach to measuring party positions is more and
another less consistent with a particular theoretically
anchored investigation.
Some theoretical interests reside with the ideologi-
cal standing of parties with respect to their longstand-
ing core principles. In those cases, expert survey data
can be expected to perform well. It is the longstanding
core principles, we surmise, that give rise to expert
surveys persistently positioning a party in a similar
left-right location across time. If experts, on average,
across the several experts from each country, are re-
cording the longstanding core principle positions of
parties, then investigations of whether a party’s ideo-
logical position predicts particular policy stands
among its adherentsdsay, for a member of the Euro-
pean Parliament who sits among one of the transna-
tional parliamentary party groupings somewhat
detached from the daily twists and turns of domestic
political debates or for a member of the mass public
who is likely to have a general, not specific, idea of
his or her preferred party’s position takingdit would
be wise to use party locations measured as longstand-
ing core principle as the indicator of a national party’s
ideological position. For theoretical concerns that in-
volve party and partisan activity closer to home, and
in the sometimes strategic maneuvering of electoral
politics, taking account of the shorter run dynamics
will usually have importance.
As for the muted cross-national variation in expert
surveys, its consideration may well highlight the es-
sential nature of the problem faced when measuring
left-right positions through this method. The concept
of left-right has no secure anchor. Experts are left to
determine their own individual frame of reference.
Each expert respondent may set his or her reference
in accordance with, say, what it means to be centrist
in the expert’s own nation. But, because being centrist
in Norway is more left-leaning than being centrist in
the United States, the between-nation distinction is
lost to the nation-specific anchors of national experts.
That the Castles-Mair and Huber-Inglehart results
have more muted cross-national variation than the
Laver-Hunt left-right score might be quite revealingJELS710_proof  14 MaD
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in that regard. That is, the Laver-Hunt distinctiveness
may be a consequence of having constructed our
Laver-Hunt left-right score from a set of anchored policy
positions in each of three policy domains, in contrast
to asking experts to locate parties along an unanchored
left-right line.9 We are not suggesting a simple-minded
reasoning process for experts when assigning left-right
positions, of the sort where an expert is supposed to
think, ‘well, this is a party in the social democratic
family, so I will give it a left-right score of 3.7.’
Rather, we suspect, experts must use some sort of an-
chor to give meaning to the left-right score they assign.
A useful candidate for the anchor, we suppose, is the
political center of the national party system. While
that works well enough for rank orderings within
nations (Mair, 2001), it leaves unanchored a center
position that would make measurements across nations
comparable.
What can be done? Where either cross-temporal or
cross-national comparability is important, interest fo-
cuses on left-right, and party positions over the past
half-century are critical, the CMP data are preferred
to the expert survey data.10 On questions related to party
positions in specific policy domainsdtaxes versus
spending, privatization, the environment, the European
Union, decentralized institutional arrangements, among
othersdexpert surveys have anchors; so, at least for
cross-national and very likely for cross-temporal com-
parisons, survey results may serve quite nicely. And,
looking ahead, expert surveys might be able to create
anchors by identifying for respondents a common refer-
encede.g., by saying to the expert respondents some-
thing like, ‘assuming the American Democrats are at
4.0 on a ten-point left-right scale, where are the parties
in your nation located?’
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